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SURYEY OF OHIO LAW -1953
lished that a defendant extradited from -another state to answer criminal
charges is immune from service of process in a civil action before convic-
Ition and before he has had an opportunity to return to his home. 4 The
old Ancinnah Superior Court had held that the immunity did not apply
in de absence of extradition proceedings. 9 The court of appeals in the
Lorok case followed what is believed to be the majority rule in holding
that the immunity exists even while one is voluntarily answering a criminal
warrant. It also held that while it is generally true that a general appearance
may not be mingled with a motion to quash service of summons, since the
plaintiff had abused process in attempting to serve the accused during
criminal proceedings, the special appearance need not be deemed to have
been waived by the defendanes filing of a motion to dismiss for want of
jurisdiction of the subject matter.
Immunity From Service of Process While Attending
Civil Case Voluntarily
Likewise, the court of appeals had occasion to pass upon the question
whether one appearing voluntarily and without having been subpoenaed as
a witness in a cvl case was immune from service of process. It held, in
Rhoads v. Denns,50 that the witness is immune. The plaintiff's contention
was that the statute'1 granting immunity to one who attends in response
to a subpoena is exclusive, and that if the witness appeared voluntarily he did
not come within the statute. The court properly held, in line with well-
established authority, that if the witness' sole purpose in entering the court's
jurisdiction is attendance at judicial proceedings, he is immune from ser-
vice of process. The statute does not derrogate from the common law im-
munity.
SAMUEL SONENFIELD
CONFLICT OF LAWS
Federal Versus State Law
As every lawyer knows, the laws of the Unit~d States made pursuant to
the Constitution of the United States are the supreme law of the land.' As
a result of our dual system of government, conflicts arise from time to time
between federal and state law, and, under the constitutional provision re-
'Compton, Ault & Co. v. Wilder, 40 Ohio St. 130 (1883).
4 Goldman v. Krumholz, 1 Ohio L. Abs. 791 '(1923).
S115 N.E.2d 708 (Ohio App. 1951).
'Omio REv. CODE S 2317.25 (OHIo GE'. CODE S 11519).
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ferred to, the federal law fs' paramount. A recent example occurs in Se-
curatws, Iw. v Louwsville & Nashtille R.R., 2 in which a garnishee of a bank-
rupt was faced with conflicting orders by a United States district Court and
a municipal court. It was correctly determined that the order of-the federal
court took precedence.
Domicile
Many laymen have an idea that by waving a wand and expressing an
intent, they can fix their domicile in a certain place even though, in fact, it is
elsewhere. An example of this-misconception arose in Redrow v Redrow,3
a case of county rather than state domicile. The plaintiff brought an action
for divorce and contended that Clermont County had always been his domri
cile, despite the fact that he and his family had moved to Hamilton County.
The court of appeals, reversing the trial court, held that the move to Hamil-
ton County constituted a- change of domicile, and pointed out that actions
speak louder than words and that the plaintiff's testimony that he regarded
Clermont County as his home and intended to return there, was not borne
out by the facts. The court pointed out also that a vague, floating intention
to return sometime to one's previous home is not sufficient for the retention
of the old domicile as against the new location, where the person apparently
intends to live indefinitely.
Halaby v. Unverstty of Cincinnatil presents an interesting problem in
statutory interpretation. Ohio Revised Code Section 3349.22 (Ohio Gen-
eral Code Section 4003-20) permits free instruction in municipal, unwer-
sities to citizens of the municipal corporation in which the particular uni-
versity is located.5 Action was brought against the University of Cincinnati
on behalf of a minor by his father as next friend, the contention being that
the minor was entitled to the free instruction prescribed by the statute. The
father and son were domiciled in Cincinnati but were not citizens of the
United States, although the father had declared his intention to become a
citizen. The court very properly determined that the statutory phrase
"citizens of municipal corporations" referred to bona fide residence or domi-
cile and not to United States citizenship.
Decree Relating to Foreign Land:. Full Faith and Credit.
Beebe v. Brownleeg recognizes the rule that the decree of a foreiga court
'(here Florida) cannotof itself effect a transfer of title to local ral .state,.
'U.S. CONST. Art VI S 2.
2-94 Ohio App. 323, 115 N.M.2d 9 (1953). 2 ,
' 94 Ohio App. 38, 114 N.E.2d 293 (1952)_ ......
* 65 Ohio L Abs. 577 (Hamilton Com. P1. 1953r)
'The statute makes exceptions whch are~not pertinent here. - - . ..
[Silrfmg
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However, the court recognizes the equally well-established rule that a court
having jurisdiction of a person may order him to convey land located in an-
other state. Thus, a Florida court having ordered the defendant to convey
Ohio land to the plaintiff, the Ohio court likewise ordered her to do so,
:ting Brunley v. Stevenson."
Adoption
In two companion cases,9 it was held that where there is insufficient
proof of adoption under the law of the state where the adoption was at-
tempted, Ohio will not regard the child as adopted. It was indicated that
the adoption would be recognized in Ohio if valid by the law of the adopting
state.' o
Custody: Full Faith and Credit
In the survey of Ohio Law for 1952, 1 referred to the case of Anderson v.
May, dealing with the effect in Ohio of a Wisconsin custody decree." The
case was subsequently taken to the Supreme Court of the United States,
where, by a divided Court, the judgment was reversed. 2 The parties were
domiciled in Wisconsin. Marital trouble having developed, they separated,
and, by agreement, the wife, accompanied 'by the children, went to Ohio to
think things over. Eventually, she decided not to return and so informed
her husband. Admittedly she gained an Ohio domicile. The husband
brought an action in Wisconsin for divorce and custody of the children.
The wife was served in Ohio and did not appear, nor were the children in
Wisconsin. The Wisconsin court granted the divorce and awarded cus-
tody of the children to the father. The mother refusing to surrender them,
*63 Ohio L Abs. 381, 109 N.E.2d 528 (App. 1052). In effect, though not tech-
nically, the court incorporates the opinion of the common pleas court, for which see
63 Ohio L Abs. 377, 110 N.E.2d 64 (Franklin Com. P1. 1951).
'See RESTATEMENT, CONFLicT OF LAws SS 223, 240 (1934)
' 24 Ohio St. 474 (1873). The Burney v. Stevenson case held that under the full
faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution (U.S. CoNsT. ART. IV, S
1), the decree of the sister state court must be regarded as conclusive of all the rights
and equities adjudicated and settled therein. The court of appeals in the Beebe case,
in addition to cting the Burnley case, agreed with the position of the common pleas
court respecting full faith and credit. The latter court said that the decree of the
Florida court was binding on the parties and could be, and was, the subject of an ac-
ton (in Ohio) to compel not only compliance with the contract but an observance
of the determination of the rights of the litigants by a court in a sister state.
' Belden v. Armstrong, 93 Ohio App. 307, 113 N.E.2d 693 (195 1); Belden v. Arm-
strong, 93 Ohio App. 358, 113 N.E.2d 697 (1951).
' See RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 143 (1934)
"4 'WEST RES. L. REv. 210 (1953).
"May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 73 Sup. Ct. 840 (1953).
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the father brought a habeas corpus action in Ohio. In an opinion by Mr.
Justice Burton, the Supreme Court held that Ohio was not required to give
full faith and credit to the Wisconsin custody decree, even though tech-
nically the children might be domiciled in Wisconsin. The court stressed
the point that the mother was not domiciled, resident, or present in Wiscon-
sin, and that there was no jurisdiction in personam over her or the chil-
dren.13
Chattel Mortgage
Following the general rule and the Restatement,14 the case of In re
Swesey' 5 holds that a Michigan chattel mortgage, valid by the law of that
state, will be upheld in Ohio as between the mortgagee's assignee and the
trustee in bankruptcy of the mortagor. The Ohio Certificate of Title Law 6
does not extend to out-of-state transactions valid where made."
In another chattel mortgage case,' 8 there was a valid chattel mortgage in
Michigan of automobiles located there. The mortgage was properly re-
corded in Michigan. Contrary to the terms of the mortgage, the mortgagor
sent the cars into Ohio. In a sale which took place in Michigan, the de-
fendant bought the cars from the mortgagor, and later took possession of
them in Ohio. He did not know about the mortgage. The mortgagee cor-
poration brought an action of conversion, and the court held in its favor,
pointing out that the defendant had taken possession prior to the issuance
of a certificate of tile in Ohio, and holding that the defendant was bound
by the Michigan chattel mortgage law.19
Res Judicate as to Jurisdiction
In re Lorok 0 is an important case holding that under the particular cir-
cumstances a determination by a Juvenile Court that it had jurisdiction of
" No attempt is made here to discuss the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Frank-
furter or the dissenting opinions.
"RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 265 (1934)
' 112 F. Supp. 773 (N.D. Ohio 1953)
"OHIO REV. CODE §§ 4505.01-4505.99 (OHIO GEN. CODE §5 6290-2 through
6290-17)
"It should be noted that this case does not involve a resale in Ohio by the mortgagor.
is Associates Discount Corp. v. Main Street Motors, Jnc., 65 Ohio L. Abs. 216, 113
N.E.2d 734 (App. 1952), app. dis'm 157 Ohio St. 488, 105 N.E.2d 878 (1952)
"The court distinguished Kelley Kar Co. v. Finkler, 155 Ohio St. 541, 99 N.E.2d
665 (1951), in which the sale to the innocent purchaser for value was in Ohio, and
the purchaser received a clean certificate of title from the seller.
93 Ohio App. 251, 114 N.E.2d 65 (1952)
'The court quoted at length from RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 10 (1942) This
section is the same as RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws § 451 (2) (1948 Supp.)
[S'pring
